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Objective. To estimate the effect of the 10 percent cap introduced to Medicare home
health care on treatment intensity and patient discharge status.
Data Sources. Medicare Denominator, Medicare Home Health Claims, and Medi-
care Provider of Services Files from 2008 through 2010.
Study Design. We used agency-level variation in the proportion of outlier payments
prior to the implementation of the 10 percent cap to identify how home health agencies
adjusted the number of home health visits and patient discharge status under the new law.
Principal Findings. Under the 10 percent cap, agencies dramatically decreased the
number of service visits. Agencies also dropped relatively healthy patients and sent
sicker patients to nursing homes.
Conclusions. The drastic reduction in the number of service visits and discontinua-
tion of relatively healthy patients from home health care suggest that the 10 percent cap
improved the efficiency of home health services as intended. However, the 10 percent
cap increased other types of health care expenditures by pushing sicker patients to use
more expensive health services.
Key Words. Home health care, outlier payments, treatment intensity, patient
discharge status
Many insurers, including Medicare and Medicaid, use outlier payments in
their prospective payment system (PPS) to compensate providers when the
actual costs far exceed the prospective payment rate (MedPAC 2008; OIG
2011; CMS 2014). Because outlier payments increase with the amount of ser-
vices provided, however, many providers strategically adjusted their service
patterns to increase outlier payments without improving patients’ health sta-
tus. This has contributed to surging health care expenditures (Silverman
2003; Baser et al. 2009; CMS 2009). In response, insurers have increased
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monitoring of outlier payments and cut outlier payment rates (Baser et al.
2009; CMS 2009). The hope behind these efforts is that providers would
eliminate inefficient services without harming the quality of care. Inconsistent
with this hope, however, providers could respond by reducing treatment
intensity or selectively serving profitable patients (Ellis 1998). These unin-
tended responses could exacerbate patients’ health, and the affected patients
might incur greater health care costs in the long run.
This study explores how Medicare’s outlier payment adjustment for
home health care influenced treatment intensity and discharge status for home
health patients. In 2010, Medicare home health care introduced the 10 percent
per-agency cap on outlier payments. The 10 percent cap restricts total outlier
payments for each home health agency to no more than 10 percent of that
agency’s total annual prospective payments from Medicare (CMS 2009).
Notably, the level of the cap varies depending on the total annual Medicare
payments for each agency. This allows important variation for identifying the
effect of the 10 percent cap. That is, only agencies that had outlier payments
close to or higher than 10 percent prior to 2010 would have an incentive to
decrease outlier payments.
We find that the 10 percent cap dramatically decreased the treatment
intensity and also affected agencies’ decision on patient discharge status. How-
ever, this overall treatment effect may mask important treatment heterogene-
ity. That is, the effect of the 10 percent cap could be more evident among
costly patients who require many visits and are likely to be eligible for outlier
payments, such as those with diabetes with long-term use of insulin. Diabetic
patients tend to need multiple daily injections of insulin and greatly rely on
home health visits to lead independent lives (CMS 2009). Therefore, we also
analyze the effects of the 10 percent cap on this subgroup.
To date, research on outlier payments has primarily focused on ones
embedded to Medicare hospital PPS. Some hospitals’ proportion of outlier
payments was substantially high even after controlling for patients’ length of
stay, which suggests potential gaming of the payment system (OIG 2013).
Baser et al. (2009) found that the increased scrutiny of Medicare’s outlier pay-
ments for cardiac surgery decreased the proportion of procedures eligible for
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outlier payments. As far as we know, however, no studies have explored the
effect of the outlier payment adjustments inMedicare home health care.
Background
In 2000, Medicare home health introduced the PPS. The PPS makes a fixed,
risk-adjusted payment for each patient every 2-month-long episode. Home
health agencies therefore end up bearing extra treatment costs beyond the
fixed payment rate under the PPS. The PPS was thus expected to control ris-
ing home health expenditures, but home health expenditures continued to
increase under the PPS (MedPAC 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
One of the primary reasons for the expenditure growth is the retrospec-
tive feature embedded in the PPS. That is, agencies get reimbursed more if
they provide more visits for certain cases. Medicare added the retrospective
features to the PPS because the PPS can potentially discourage agencies from
treating high-cost patients whose treatment costs would most likely exceed the
fixed payment rates. Thus, certain patients might struggle to receive the quan-
tity and quality of care they need. However, many agencies took advantage of
these retrospective features only to get higher payment rates. For example, the
PPS reimbursed an agency $2,000 once the agency had provided 10 therapy
visits each episode, providing a strong incentive for agencies to target the 10th
therapy visit. The episodes that provided 10 or more visits and received extra
payments increased almost twice as fast as all other episodes under the PPS
(MedPAC 2011, 2012, 2013). In 2008, Medicare replaced the single threshold
at the 10th therapy visit with multiple staggered thresholds to prevent agen-
cies’ targeting the 10th visit, but this new reimbursement schedule still encour-
ages agencies to provide more therapy visits for higher reimbursement
amounts (MedPAC 2012, 2013, 2014).
Agencies also exploited outlier payments of the PPS, which is the focus
of our study. If a patient’s episode incurs an unusually high cost and her esti-
mated cost exceeds a threshold amount, the patient becomes eligible for out-
lier payments and the patient’s agency receives an extra payment (i.e., outlier
payment) in addition to the regular prospective payment (HCFA 2000). The
outlier payment amount is set as a proportion (80 percent) of estimated cost
beyond the threshold amount. (Appendix Table S1 provides information
about the calculation of outlier payments.) Thus, agencies may find outlier
payments attractive because the marginal benefit of one visit increases from
zero to positive once their patients qualify for outlier payments. Outlier
payments might encourage agencies to provide extra visits for patients whose
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estimated treatment costs are high enough to make them eligible for outlier
payments (HCFA 2000). Agencies might also want to increase the number of
visits as much as possible for each patient eligible for outlier payments.
In fact, many agencies manipulated outlier payments. There had been a
dramatic rise in outlier payments in a few counties. For example, in 2008, 52
percent of all outlier payments nationwide were made to agencies in one
county, Miami-Dade in Florida, where only 2 percent of all home health
patients resided. In the same year, 23 other counties exhibited similar outlier
payment patterns to that of Miami-Dade County (OIG 2009;MedPAC 2010).
As a result, in 2010, Medicare implemented an agency-level cap for out-
lier patients, such that, in any given year, an individual agency would receive
nomore than 10 percent of its total home health reimbursement in outlier pay-
ments. If a claim with an outlier payment causes an agency to exceed the 10
percent cap, then Medicare would not make the outlier payment of the claim
(CMS 2009).
The outlier share of total payments is calculated on a continuous basis.
Medicare tracks both the total and outlier payments for each agency when
each claim is processed and determines whether the 10 percent cap has been
met. If the cap has been met, any outlier payments are not then paid. If subse-
quent payments change whether an agency has met the 10 percent cap, Medi-
care may then pay the unpaid outlier payments (CMS 2013).
Medicare expected that the 10 percent cap would diminish agencies’
incentives to provide unnecessary service visits. However, the 10 percent cap
could penalize agencies that legitimately served costly patients and affect the
care for expensive patients. One group of patients potentially affected by the
10 percent cap was those with diabetes who need multiple daily injections of
insulin. Many diabetic patients cannot safely administer their insulin because
they have visual, cognitive, or dexterity impairments. If such patients have no
access to informal caregivers, then they must receive home health visits that
provide multiple daily insulin injections. This makes them costly outlier
patients. Without home health visits, however, these patients cannot live inde-
pendently and might end up relying on more expensive health care services,
such as nursing home or inpatient services (CMS 2009).
EXPECTED EFFECTS OF THE TEN PERCENTCAP
This section explains how agencies could adjust treatment intensity and
patient discharge status under the 10 percent cap.
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First, agencies would decrease the number of visits for patients under the
10 percent cap. Without the 10 percent cap in place, agencies would increase
the number of visits as much as possible to take advantage of a positive mar-
ginal value of one visit among outlier patients. Under the 10 percent cap, how-
ever, agencies would be compelled to keep their proportion of outlier
payments under 10 percent. Otherwise, they would have to bear the full cost
of extra treatments beyond the 10 percent cap. Therefore, if an agency’s out-
lier payments exceeded the 10 percent cap in prior years, the agency would
face pressure to reduce the number of visits for outlier episodes. This reduc-
tion in the number of visits could either make a patient no longer eligible for
outlier payments or allow them to remain eligible for outlier payments while
receiving fewer visits than before. The pressure to adjust the number of visits
within each agency would increase with the level of outlier payments, if higher
than 10 percent.
Second, the 10 percent cap would affect agencies’ decisions on
patient discharge status. Notably, the effect on patient discharge status
would be most evident among patients who most likely require many vis-
its and are potentially eligible for outlier payments because agencies would
want to drop patients who are highly likely to contribute to total outlier
payments. However, this adjustment would vary based on each patient’s
relative health status. Relatively healthy patients would be more likely to
be discontinued from home health care because they could be more capa-
ble of taking care of themselves without home health care. On the other
end of the spectrum, the sickest patients would tend to require many visits,
greatly contributing to the increase in total outlier payments. However, it
would be challenging to decrease the number of visits for these sickest
patients because even a small reduction in the number of visits could lead
to a significant decline in their health. To avoid these high-cost patients,
agencies could send them to nursing homes or hospitals. However, the
incentive for an agency to send their patient to a hospital might not be
strong because the percentage of patients admitted to a hospital is one of
the quality measures publicly reported on Home Health Compare. High
hospitalization rates would adversely affect an agency’s reputation.
Data
This study uses year 2008–2010 data from CMS 5 percent Limited Data
Set-Denominator File, CMS 5 percent Limited Data Set-Home Health
Claims, and CMS Provider of Services File. Using the first two datasets,
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we create a panel of 5 percent of Medicare home health patients that
contains their demographics, health condition, and home health service
use. The last dataset is a panel of all agencies across the nation and
includes their basic characteristics, including location, ownership type,
and date of initial Medicare certification. We merge the first two and
last datasets, creating a patient-agency linked, unbalanced panel. Each
observation in this dataset corresponds to a patient’s 60-day-long epi-
sode of care. Descriptive statistics on main variables are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Demographic Characteristics, Health Condi-
tions, and HomeHealth Service Use in 2008
Patient Characteristics All Patients Diabetes Patients
Demographic factors
Age 76.3 (11.7) 71.5 (11.9)
Female (%) 63.5 60.3
Race (%)
White 82.8 65.8
Nonwhite 17.2 34.2
Buy-in (%) 25.7 46.4
Total number of patients 119,007 2,798
Episodes for
All Patients
Episodes for
Diabetes Patients
Health condition
Prior acute-care stay (%) 28.77 16.1
Clinical severity (%)
Low 19.8 1.6
Moderate 35.2 31.7
High 45.0 66.6
Functional severity
Low 28.6 30.1
Moderate 49.7 50.5
High 21.7 19.4
Service use
Outlier episode (%) 2.9 31.9
Number of visits 18.3 (20.8) 49.0 (56.4)
Discharge status
Discontinuation from home health care (%) 49.5 29.1
Nursing home admission (%) 0.6 0.4
Hospitalization (%) 2.4 2.9
Total number of episodes 214,650 5,294
Note.Wepresent each main variable’s mean and standard deviation (in parentheses).
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Empirical Strategy
We exploit agency-level variation in the proportion of outlier payments and
identify the effect of the 10 percent cap on treatment intensity and patient dis-
charge status. We first create a measure of each agency’s proportion of outlier
payments at a base year (Appendix Table S2 explains how we calculated each
agency’s proportion of outlier payments at a base year). The base year is year
2008 for an agency that served any episodes in 2008 and year 2009 for an
agency that served episodes in 2009, but none in 2008. We drop agencies that
had episodes only in 2010.
We then model each agency’s outlier proportion as a spline function
where the knots are at 10, 20, and 30 percent. We choose the highest knot as
30 percent because the highest outlier proportion in our dataset was 46 per-
cent and there were relatively few agencies with more than 30. We use splines
because splines allow substantial flexibility in capturing the relationship
between the outcome variables and each agency’s outlier proportion at a base
year (Marsh and Cormier 2002). We then interact these splines with year
dummy variables. We consider these interactions because a patient would
have experienced a more drastic change in home health use in 2010 if the
patient was served by an agency that had outlier payments higher than 10 per-
cent of total prospective payments at a base year.
We estimate an episode-level regression (1) to understand the effect of
the 10 percent cap on treatment intensity. The dependent variable Ykijt repre-
sents (1) each episode’s likelihood of being eligible for outlier payments and
(2) number of visits per episode:
Ykijt ¼ b0 þ
X
b1aprop
a
j þ
X
b2t yeart þ
X
b3at prop
a
j  yeart þ Agencyjtd
þ patientkijtcþ Seasonalitykthþ Statesuþ kijt
ð1Þ
where k, i, j, and t refer to an episode, patient, agency, and year. Propaj repre-
sents four splines for each agency j’s outlier proportion out of total prospective
payments at a base year (a = 0 to 10, 10 to 20, 20 to 30, and 30 and above).
Yeart refers to the year dummy variables with the omitted group of year 2008.
Agencyjt represents each agency’s characteristics, including ownership, annual
number of episodes served by each agency, and facility-affiliation status.
Patientkijt denotes each patient’s characteristics, including age, gender, race,
participation in theMedicare Buy-in program, clinical and functional severity,
an indicator whether each patient was on first/second or third and after
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episode of care, an indicator of whether each patient stayed in an acute-care
setting prior to a home health admission, and indicators of most frequent
health diagnoses. We also control for Seasonalitykt, an indicator for the quarters
of each year. We include state fixed effects States because each state might have
different regulations affecting home health services.
To understand the effect of the 10 percent cap, we further predict out-
come values for a typical patient served by a typical agency based on spline
regression estimates.We then present how predicted outcomes vary each year,
depending on each agency’s proportion of outlier payments at the base year.
The predicted outcome value is expected to be significantly different in 2010 if
an agency’s proportion of outlier payments was close to or beyond the 10 per-
cent cap at the base year.
We also examine the effect of the 10 percent cap on each patient’s dis-
charge status. Patient discharge status could vary based on each patient’s
health condition. We thus consider three-way interaction terms between year
dummy variables, splines of each agency’s proportion of outlier payments,
and measure of each patient’s level of functional severity. We use the level of
functional severity as a proxy of each patient’s health condition because many
patients rely on home health services when they have functional limitations
and it could substantially affect a patient’s use of home health services (Med-
PAC, 2009). In addition, this measure is unlikely to be affected by home
health visits provided because agencies are required to assess each patient’s
health and determine the level of functional severity at the beginning of each
episode.
Agencies give a score to each of the five factors of a patient’s functional
status (dressing upper or lower body, bathing, toileting, transferring, and
ambulation) at the beginning of episode of care. Agencies then assign one
functional score out of three (low, moderate, and high) to each patient based
on the added scores from each factor, along with the duration of care (whether
a patient was on her first/second or third and after episode of care) and the
expected number of therapy visits (0–13, 14–19, or 20+ therapy visits) (CMS
2007).
Using this functional limitation assessment system, we run regression
(Equation 2) among two different groups: patients on their 1st and 2nd episode
with 0 to 13 therapy visits (50.9 percent of total sample) and patients on their
3rd or later episode with 0 to 13 therapy visits (32.5 percent of total sample).
We do not consider other groups of patients for separate regressions due to
their relatively small number of episodes.
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The basic episode-level regression (2) takes the following form:
Ykijt ¼ b0 þ
X
b1aprop
a
j þ
X
b2t yeart þ
X
b3f Function
f
kijt
þ
X
b4at prop
a
j  yeart
þ
X
b5af prop
a
j  Functionfkijt
þ
X
b6tf yeart  Functionfkijt þ
X
b7atf prop
a
j
 yeart  Functionfkijt þ Agencyjtdþ Patientkijtcþ Seasonalitykth
þ Statesuþ ijkt
ð2Þ
where Ykijt represents patient discharge status, including discontinuation from
home health care (at the end of each episode of care), nursing home admission
(in the middle of an episode of care), and hospitalization (in the middle of an
episode of care). Functionfkijt represents two dummy variables of each patient’s
level of functional severity (low [reference group], moderate, and high level).
In both regression (1) and (2), we estimate linear probability models for
each dependent variable. Results are essentially the same when we estimate
probit models instead. However, we prefer the ordinary least-squares results
due to the more straightforward inference with the interaction term estimates.
Standard errors are clustered on agency.
The critical identifying assumption of this empirical strategy is that there
were no differential trends between agencies that had low and high propor-
tions of outlier payments. In other words, the correlation between each
agency’s proportion of outlier payments and unobserved factors of each
patient’s service use and discharge status did not change contemporaneously
with the implementation of the 10 percent cap. For example, if there were
mean reversion in home health utilization, agencies with high outlier propor-
tion prior to 2010 would experience decreases in utilization in 2010, even in
the absence of any policy change. Because mean reversion is a concern, we
address it by checking whether there was any evidence of mean reversion in
the early period of time. If we see no mean reversion in the early period of
time, then we should not expect mean reversion in later years, before and after
2010. For that purpose, we use the early period of data, 2005–2007, and repli-
cate the analysis in regression (Equation 1).
The effect of the 10 percent cap might be more evident among costly
patients who require many visits and are likely eligible for outlier payments,
such as those with diabetes with long-term use of insulin (termed as diabetes
patients hereafter). Thus, we also conduct the same analyses on this subgroup
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of patients. Diabetes patients deserve separate analysis also because many of
them cannot lead independent lives without home health visits because of
their vulnerable health conditions.
RESULTS
Effect on Treatment Intensity
Overall results indicate that the 10 percent cap reduced treatment intensity.
Figure 1 presents the predicted likelihood of having episodes eligible for out-
lier payments and predicted number of visits between 2008 and 2010. As seen
in Figure 1A, in 2008, if a patient was served by agencies with 10, 20, 30, and
40 percent of outlier payments, then the patient’s predicted likelihood of hav-
ing episodes eligible for outlier payments was 0.11, 0.19, 0.29, and 0.73,
respectively. In 2010 following implementation of the 10 percent, the corre-
sponding likelihoods decreased to 0.09, 0.15, 0.17, and 0.34, respectively. Rel-
ative to the average likelihood of having episodes eligible for outlier payments
in 2008 (0.029), the size of these decreases seems substantial. As predicted in
the conceptual framework, the decrease in patients’ likelihood of having out-
lier episodes by the addition of the 10 percent cap was significant only when
their agency’s proportion of outlier payments was beyond the 10 percent prior
to implementation of the policy. In addition, both the size and significance of
the decrease increased with agencies’ proportion of outlier payments at a base
year.
Even when patients continued to have episodes eligible for outlier pay-
ments, the 10 percent cap caused agencies to decrease the number of visits
drastically. As seen in Figure 1B, in 2008, patients whose agency had 10, 20,
30, and 40 percent of outlier payments were predicted to receive 89.3, 100.7,
110.1, and 139.9 visits per episode, respectively. In 2010, the corresponding
numbers of visits per episode decreased to 85.1, 84.6, 89.2, and 94.2. The size
of the decreases was (statistically significantly) larger if patients were served by
an agency with a higher proportion of outlier payments, if higher than 10 per-
cent. Relative to the average number of visits among outlier episodes in 2008
(n = 103.6), these decreases are not trivial.
As a robustness check, we examine the number of visits for nonoutlier
patients, but we do not find the same pattern of service number decreases
among this population (see Figure 1C). This reconfirms our finding that the
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big decrease in the number of visits among patients in 2010 was exclusively
due to the 10 percent cap. Appendix Table S3 provides the spline regression
estimation results used to calculate the predicted likelihood and number of
visits.
As a test for problems of mean reversion, we also replicate the analysis
using 2005–2007 data. If mean reversion were driving the results in Figure 1,
we should find similar patterns in the falsification exercise in the absence of
the 10 percent cap. However, as seen in Appendix Figure S1, the results in the
falsification exercise suggest no mean reversion and thus mean reversion does
not drive findings in Figure 1.
Figure 2 presents the effect of the 10 percent cap on treatment intensity
among diabetes patients. We find similar effects on diabetes patients. In 2010,
diabetes patients were less likely to have episodes eligible for outlier payments
(see Figure 2A). The 10 percent cap also decreased the number of visits for
outlier diabetes patients (Figure 2B), but it did not influence the number of vis-
its for nonoutlier diabetes patients (Figure 2C).
Effect on Patient Discharge Status
Figure 3 presents the effect of the 10 percent cap on patient discharge status
among all home health patients. As seen in Figure 3A, the 10 percent cap
led agencies to discontinue care from patients with a low level of functional
severity (who were on their first or second episode of care) without sending
Figure 1: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Treatment Intensity. (A) Pre-
dicted Likelihood of Having Outlier Episode and 95 Percent Confidence
Interval between 2008 and 2010; (B) Predicted Number of Visits and 95 Per-
cent Confidence Interval among Outlier Episodes between 2008 and 2010;
(C) Predicted Number of Visits and 95 Percent Confidence Interval among
NonOutlier Episodes between 2008 and 2010
Notes: We estimated each equation using an ordinary least-squares regression, with standard errors
clustered on home health agency. In each equation, other control variables include agency’s char-
acteristics, including ownership type, facility-based status, and the number of employed nurses,
physical therapists, and home health aides; each patient’s characteristics, including age, gender,
race/ethnicity, participation in theMedicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity,
acute-care stay prior to home health care, and most frequent major health diagnoses; seasonality;
and state indicators.We then predicted each outcome variable on a typical patient served by a typ-
ical agency and present how the predicted outcome varies each year.
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them to a nursing home or hospital. These mildly disabled patients, if they
were served by agencies with 30 percent or higher outlier payments, were
more likely to discontinue from home health care in 2010 than in 2008.
The discrepancy in the likelihood of discontinuation between 2008 and
2010 increased in agencies’ outlier proportion (if higher than 30 percent).
However, the likelihood of discontinuation was not different between 2008
and 2010 for patients with a high level of functional severity (as seen in
Appendix Figure S2a, there is an overlap between 95 percent confidence
intervals for the likelihood of discontinuation for the years 2008 and 2010
of patients with a high level of functional severity). Agencies might find it
easier to discontinue care from relatively healthy patients who are more
likely to be able to take care of themselves. We find the similar pattern
among patients on their third or later episode of care, but the size of dis-
crepancy in the likelihood of discontinuation between 2008 and 2010 was
smaller and less significant (see Appendix Figure S4a). Inconsistent with
our prediction, the 10 percent cap did not lead agencies to send their
patients to a nursing home or hospital (see Figure 3B and C).
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the 10 percent cap on diabetes patients’
discharge status. The effect of the 10 percent cap is expected to be more
evident for diabetes patients who are highly likely eligible for outlier pay-
ments, which turned out to be true in our analysis. The 10 percent cap led
agencies to adjust diabetes patients’ discharge status in two ways.
Figure 2: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Treatment Intensity among
Diabetes Patients. (A) Predicted Likelihood of Having Outlier Episode and 95
Percent Confidence Interval between 2008 and 2010; (B) Predicted Number
of Visits and 95 Percent Confidence Interval amongOutlier Episodes between
2008 and 2010; (C) Predicted Number of Visits and 95 Percent Confidence
Interval among Non-Outlier Episodes between 2008 and 2010
Notes: We estimated each equation using an ordinary least-squares regression, with standard errors
clustered on home health agency. In each equation, other control variables include agency’s char-
acteristics, including ownership type, facility-based status, and the number of employed nurses,
physical therapists, and home health aides; each patient’s characteristics, including age, gender,
race/ethnicity, participation in theMedicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity,
acute-care stay prior to home health care, and most frequent major health diagnoses; seasonality;
and state indicators.We then predicted each outcome variable on a typical patient served by a typ-
ical agency and present how the predicted outcome varies each year.
1618 HSR: Health Services Research 50:5 (October 2015)
(A)
(B)
(C)
Effects of the Ten Percent Cap in Medicare Home Health Care 1619
First, agencies were more likely to discontinue care from diabetes
patients with a low level of functional severity under the 10 percent cap (see
Figure 4A). We find the same effect in the analysis with all patients, but the
increase in the likelihood of discontinuation was much greater for diabetes
patients. Interestingly, the effect on the likelihood of discontinuation was obvi-
ous only among patients on their first or second episode of care, but not for
patients whose duration of care was longer (i.e., those on their third or later
episode of care) (see Appendix Figure S5a). Agencies might find it harder to
stop providing services for diabetes patients who have received visits for a
longer period of time, and the strength of relationship between a provider and
patients might matter.
Second, under the 10 percent cap, a diabetes patient with a high
level of functional severity was more likely to leave home health care
and instead enter a nursing home (see Figure 4B). For example, in 2010,
patients with a high level of functional severity whose agency had 25 to
35 percent of outlier payments in a base year were more likely to enter
a nursing home, compared to the corresponding patients in 2008. Agen-
cies might find it challenging to dramatically decrease the number of vis-
Figure 3: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status by a
Patient’s Functional Severity (after a Patient’s First or Second Episode of
Care). (A) Predicted Likelihood of Discontinuation from Home Health Care
and 95 Percent Confidence Interval between 2008 and 2010
Notes: (A) The 95 percent confidence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a
low level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S2 for the 95 percent con-
fidence intervals for patients with a high level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. (B) The 95
percent confidence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a high level of
functional severity in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S2 for the 95 percent confidence inter-
vals for patients with a low level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. (C) The 95 percent confi-
dence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a high level of functional
severity in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S2 for the 95 percent confidence intervals for
patients with a low level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. For (A)–(C), we estimate each
equation using an ordinary least-squares regression, with standard errors clustered on home
health agency. In each equation, other control variables include agency’s characteristics, including
ownership type, facility-based status, and the number of employed nurses, physical therapists, and
home health aides; each patient’s characteristics, including age, gender, race/ethnicity, participa-
tion in the Medicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity, acute-care stay prior to
home health care, and most frequent major health diagnoses; seasonality; and state indicators. We
then predict each outcome variable on a typical patient served by a typical agency and present
how the predicted outcome varies each year.
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its for severely disabled diabetes patients and determine to send them to
nursing homes. Again, this pattern was found only among patients on
their first or second episode of care, but not those who on third or later
episode of care (see Appendix Figure S5b).
The 10 percent cap did not affect each diabetes patient’s likelihood of
getting admitted to a hospital. As shown in Figure 4C, a patient’s likelihood of
hospitalization did not vary depending on the patient’s level of functional
severity or her agency’s proportion of outlier payments. Although this contra-
dicts the prediction that agencies are more likely to send sicker patients to a
hospital under the 10 percent cap, as discussed above, admitting patients to a
hospital is not a good strategy because of the public reporting onHomeHealth
Compare. That is, agencies might send sicker patients to a nursing home in
advance rather than waiting for patients’ health to get worse and then require
a hospital admission.
Figure 4: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status among
Diabetes Patients by a Patient’s Functional Severity (after Their First or Sec-
ond Episode of Care). (A) Predicted Likelihood of Discontinuation from
Home Health Care and 95 Percent Confidence Interval between 2008 and
2010; (B) Predicted Likelihood of Nursing Home Admission and 95 Percent
Confidence Interval between 2008 and 2010; (C) Predicted Likelihood of
Hospitalization and 95 Percent Confidence Interval between 2008 and 2010
Notes: (A) The 95 percent confidence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a
low level of functional severity both in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S3 for the 95 percent
confidence intervals for patients with a high level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. (B) The
95 percent confidence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a high level of
functional severity both in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S3 for the 95 percent confidence
intervals for patients with a low level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. (C) The 95 percent
confidence intervals are only for predicted likelihoods for patients with a high level of functional
severity both in 2008 and 2010. See Appendix Figure S3 for the 95 percent confidence intervals
for patients with a low level of functional severity in 2008 and 2010. For (A)–(C), we estimate each
equation using an ordinary least-squares regression, with standard errors clustered on home
health agency. In each equation, other control variables include agency’s characteristics, including
ownership type, facility-based status, and the number of employed nurses, physical therapists, and
home health aides; each patient’s characteristics, including age, gender, race/ethnicity, participa-
tion in the Medicare buy-in program, clinical severity, functional severity, acute-care stay prior to
home health care, and most frequent major health diagnoses; seasonality; and state indicators. We
then predict each outcome variable on a typical patient served by a typical agency and present
how the predicted outcome varies each year.
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DISCUSSION
This study explores the changes in treatment intensity and patient discharge
status after the introduction of 10 percent cap to Medicare home health care.
The cap led to a dramatic decrease in the number of service visits and also
affected agencies’ decisions on patient discharge status. On average, patients
with the lowest level of functional severity were determined healthy enough
and were discontinued from home health care without receiving any other
types of formal health services. In particular, when we focus on diabetes
patients with long-term use of insulin, those who are highly likely eligible for
outlier payments, the effect on patients’ discontinuation from home health
care was more evident. These findings, along with the large reduction in the
number of visits, suggest that the 10 percent cap improved the efficiency of
home health services as intended. However, it is uncertain how the discontinu-
ation from home health care and the reduced treatment intensity affect
patients’ health conditions and use of other health services in the long run.
We also find that the 10 percent cap pushed sicker diabetes patients to
enter nursing homes. The finding indicates that the 10 percent cap had a spill-
over effect and might increase the other types of health care spending despite
its contributing to a decrease in Medicare home health spending. The pres-
ence of this potential spillover effect may justify a policy intervention that
encourages providers to retain good quality of care. For example, Medicare
could introduce a pay-for-performance program, allowing the payment rates
to vary depending on quality of care. Alternatively, Medicare could add an
extra quality measure—the percentage of patients admitted to nursing homes
—to HomeHealth Compare.
We find that the effect of the 10 percent cap on patient discharge status
was more evident for diabetes patients who tend to require many visits and are
highly likely to be eligible for outlier payments: They were more likely to stop
receiving care and enter the nursing home. This finding suggests that Medi-
care pay special attention to care for this vulnerable patient population with
diabetes under the 10 percent cap.
In sum, this study provides evidence that agencies decreased treatment
intensity and adjusted patient discharge status under the 10 percent cap. In
future work, we hope to calculate the spillover effect of the 10 percent cap on
total health expenditures. The availability of data on each Medicare benefi-
ciary’s health service use and expenditures in all types of health services will
be necessary for such future assessments.
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Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
article:
Appendix SA1: AuthorMatrix.
Table S1. Calculation of Outlier Payment.
Table S2. Calculation of Each Agency’s Proportion of Outlier Payments.
Table S3. Spline Regression Estimates: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on
Treatment Intensity.
Table S4. Spline Regression Estimates: Influence of Ten Percent Cap on
Patient Discharge Status after a Patient’s First or Second Episode of Care by a
Patient’s Functional Severity.
Figure S1. Predicted Likelihood of Being Eligible for Outlier Payments
and Predicted Number of Visits between 2005 and 2007.
Figure S2. Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status by a
Patient’s Functional Severity (after a Patient’s First or Second Episode of
Care).
Figure S3. Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status
among Diabetes Patients by a Patient’s Functional Severity (after Their First or
Second Episode of Care).
Figure S4. Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status by a
Patient’s Functional Severity (after a Patient’s Third or Later Episode of Care).
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Figure S5. Influence of Ten Percent Cap on Patient Discharge Status
among Diabetes Patients by a Patient’s Functional Severity (after Their Third
or Later Episode of Care).
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